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2I. Introduction
After 9/11, when the holes in the U.S.’s immigration system became painfully 
apparent, the federal government began a concerted push to get local authorities involved 
in the enforcement of immigration laws.  In April 2002, the Justice Department wrote 
(but did not release) a legal opinion stating that cities and states have “inherent authority” 
as sovereigns to enforce immigration laws.1 Then-Attorney General John Ashcroft 
followed up with an invitation to local police to enforce immigration laws as part of “our 
narrow anti-terrorism mission.”2 And members of Congress have drafted legislation to 
give financial incentives to cities and states to enforce immigration laws (and financial 
penalties for those which refuse).3 The goal:  to dramatically multiply the enforcement 
power of federal immigration authorities by enlisting the aid of local police and other 
local authorities, who are already “on the beat” in America’s cities and towns. 
 While some local governments enthusiastically embraced the opportunity to 
enforce immigration laws,4 others refused to become involved, passing laws that limit, to 
different degrees, their authority to cooperate in immigration law enforcement (“non-
 
1 In April 2003, a coalition of immigrant rights and civil rights groups sued DOJ, seeking disclosure of the 
opinion pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  The Second Circuit, in a decision issued in 
May 2005, ordered DOJ to release the opinion, holding that it was not protected by FOIA’s deliberative 
process exemption or the attorney-client privilege.  Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 04-
5474-cv, 2005 WL 1274270, at *6, *9 (2d Cir. May 31, 2005).  DOJ’s 2002 legal memo (with redactions 
by DOJ), available at http://www.aclu.org/ImmigrantsRights/ImmigrantsRights.cfm?ID=19039&c=22.   
2 Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks on the National Security Entry-Exit Registration 
System (June 6, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/ 060502agpreparedremarks.htm 
(last visited June 3, 2005) [hereinafter Ashcroft Remarks on N-SEERS].  The National Security Entry-Exit 
Registration System required nonimmigrant males sixteen years or older from certain countries (mostly 
Arab and Muslim countries) to register with the federal government.  N-SEERS was subsumed by US-
VISIT, an automated system applicable to all nonimmigrant visitors to the United States.  Special Checks 
on Muslims at Border to End, UPI NEWS, June 14, 2004, 00:00:00, WESTLAW, UPINEWSPERSP 
Database. 
3 See Section II.C.1, infra.
4 Florida, Alabama and Los Angeles County have entered into memoranda of understanding with the 
Department of Homeland Security.  State, Local Law Enforcement Get Support to Enforce Immigration 
Laws, PR NEWSWIRE, May 18, 2005, 23:31:00, WESTLAW, PRWIRE Database. 
3cooperation laws”).5 The language and scope of these non-cooperation laws vary.  A 
typical non-cooperation law was that passed by the state of Alaska in May 2003, 
prohibiting Alaskan agencies from using state resources to enforce immigration laws.6 In 
Fresno, California, the non-cooperation law is much more specific:  prohibiting the police 
from reporting undocumented immigrants to federal immigration authorities in cases 
where no other crimes have been committed.7 And Seattle’s ordinance, passed in January 
2003, cuts off local cooperation at an earlier pass by prohibiting police officers and other 
city employees from even inquiring about the immigration status of any person, unless 
otherwise required by law.8
These cities, towns and states (collectively “local governments”) oppose local 
cooperation in immigration law enforcement for various reasons:  concern for immigrants 
who may shun essential government services (police protection, schools, and hospitals) 
for fear of being deported, concern for public safety as immigrants may not report crimes 
or cooperate in criminal investigations, concern about racial profiling and civil liberties 
generally, and concern about overburdened police departments in times of strained local 
budgets.9 In all, some 49 cities and towns and three states have non-cooperation laws 
 
5 Cooperation is defined as “voluntarily using resources to work toward a common goal.” THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th Ed. 2000), available at www.dictionary.com.
Though I refer to non-cooperation “laws,” in fact, local governments seeking to limit local cooperation with 
immigration law enforcement have passed measures in various legal forms:  laws, ordinances, resolutions, 
and departmental policies.  I discuss the significance of these various legal forms in Section II.C.2.A, infra.
6 Alaska State Resolution 22 states in relevant part: “an agency or instrumentality of the state may not (1) 
use state resources or institutions for the enforcement of federal immigration matters, which are the 
responsibility of the federal government. . .”  H.J.R. Res. 22, 23d Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2003). 
7 Fresno Police Department Standing Order 3.8.13 (effective July 1, 2003) (on file with author). 
8 The relevant provision of Seattle’s ordinance provides, “[U]nless otherwise required by law or by court 
order, no Seattle City officer or employee shall inquire into the immigration status of any person, or engage 
in activities designed to ascertain the immigration status of any person.”  SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL 
CODE, § 4.18.015(A) (2003). 
9 As an example, the non-enforcement policy implemented by the Houston Police Department seems to be 
motivated mostly by concerns that the police maintain a cooperative relationship with immigrant 
communities. “Without the assurances they will not be deported, many illegal immigrants with critical 
4limiting or outright prohibiting their police and other authorities from cooperating in 
immigration law enforcement.10 
Contrast these non-cooperation laws with two federal laws passed in 1996 (“1996 
laws”), requiring local cooperation in immigration enforcement.  Passed as part of 
separate welfare and immigration reform efforts, these laws prohibit local governments 
from preventing their employees from voluntarily reporting the immigration status of any 
individual to federal authorities.  Section 434 of the Welfare Reform Act provides in 
relevant part:   
[N]o State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, 
from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in 
the United States. 
 
8 U.S.C. §1644 (2000). 
 
Section 642 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(“IIRIRA”) contains almost identical language and further prohibits government entities 
from restricting the authority of their employees in: 
[s]ending such [immigration] information to, or requesting or receiving such 
information from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service  . . . [m]aintaining 
such information . . . [or] [e]xchanging such information with any other Federal, 
State, or local government entity. 
 
8 U.S.C. §1373 (2000).   
 
information would not come forward,” said Craig Ferrell, deputy director and administrative general 
counsel for the Houston Police Department (HPD) Chief’s Command Legal Services. Ferrell further noted 
that, “Police depend on the cooperation of immigrant communities to help them solve all sorts of crimes 
and to maintain public order.” Peggy O’Hare, HPD Policy on Aliens Is Hands-Off / Status of Immigrants 
Viewed as Federal Issue, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 3, 2003, at 15.  The HPD policy itself states, “[W]e must 
rely upon the cooperation of all persons, including citizens, documented aliens, and undocumented aliens, 
in our effort to maintain public order and combat crime.” Sam Nuchia, Chief of Police, Houston Police 
Department, General Order to the Houston Police Department (June 25, 1992) (on file with author). 
10 NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR, ANNOTATED CHART OF LAWS, RESOLUTIONS, AND POLICIES INSTITUTED 
ACROSS THE U.S. PROTECTING RESIDENTS FROM LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS, (2004) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter NILC ANNOTATED CHART]. 
5Examined closely, the 1996 laws do not require local governments to report 
undocumented persons, but rather, mandate that local government employees always 
have the option to voluntarily report the undocumented.  In other words, the 1996 laws 
require that local governments allow their employees to cooperate with federal 
immigration enforcement. 
May the federal government require local governments to cooperate with the 
enforcement of immigration law or other federal scheme?  Or may local governments 
constitutionally refuse to provide that cooperation?  The issue of cooperation is an 
important, but up to now, still unexplored area in the federalism debate. 
Under current law, the federal government appears to have the upper hand.  
Congress has authority to regulate immigration matters,11 so barring any other 
constitutional restriction,12 it had authority to pass the 1996 laws.  And the Supremacy 
Clause states that federal law is the law of the land, preempting any conflicting state or 
local law,13 so to the extent that there is direct conflict between the 1996 laws and 
individual non-cooperation laws, the 1996 laws would trump.14 Even in the absence of 
direct conflict, there is a persuasive argument that remaining non-cooperation laws may 
be preempted as impeding achievement of federal objectives.15 
Moreover, the preemptive effect of the 1996 laws is not restricted by state 
sovereignty/Tenth Amendment concerns.  Though the Supreme Court has shown 
willingness to strike down federal laws that commandeer states to take some action (e.g., 
 
11 For further analysis of Congress’ immigration power, see Section II.B.1, infra.
12 See the discussion of the Tenth Amendment, Section III, infra.
13 Article VI of the Constitution provides that the “Constitution and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made under the Authority of 
the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land.”  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
14 The local law in Fresno, California would be an example of a conflicting non-cooperation law.  For more 
detailed preemption analysis of the non-cooperation laws, see Section II.C.2.C, infra.
15 See Section II.C.2.C.ii, infra. 
6enact legislation or enforce a federal regulatory scheme),16 the Court has drawn the line at 
federal laws that simply preempt state action.17 Here, the 1996 laws do not require local 
governments to report undocumented persons; rather, the laws prohibit local governments 
from restricting their employees who voluntarily report that information.  Without a 
Tenth Amendment violation, the 1996 laws may constitutionally preempt conflicting 
non-cooperation laws.  
Yet treating the conflict between the non-cooperation laws and the 1996 federal 
legislation as a mere preemption issue, with an exclusive focus on federal interests, 
ignores the resulting harm to federalism values.  The federalism values harmed by the 
1996 laws are three-fold.  First, the 1996 laws undermine democratic rule by interfering 
with local governments’ abilities to exercise their police powers in ways they deem most 
appropriate to protect their constituents’ safety, health, and welfare.  Second, the 1996 
laws also upset the tyranny-prevention function of federalism by greatly augmenting 
federal power and disturbing the local-federal balance of power.  Finally, the 1996 laws 
harm federalism by thwarting local governments’ “right to experiment” and find the 
appropriate law enforcement balance for their communities.18 
Nor are these federalism harms limited to the immigration field.  In other areas 
where federal and local governments disagree, there is the potential for similar conflict.  
 
16 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down a federal law that required 
states to “take title” of nuclear waste or to enact legislation disposing of the waste) and Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down a federal law that required local law enforcement to conduct 
background checks on prospective gun buyers).  For more Tenth Amendment analysis, see Section III, 
infra.
17 See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (unanimously holding that a federal law restricting the 
ability of states to disclose a driver’s personal information without consent did not violate principles of 
federalism articulated in the Tenth Amendment). 
18 “To stay experimentation in things might be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.  It is one of 
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as 
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”  New 
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
7The federal government has passed or is proposing legislation that would criminalize acts 
related to medical marijuana usage, stem cell research, and physician-assisted suicide.19 
If the federal government passes cooperation laws in these areas similar to the 1996 laws, 
local governments would be required to cooperate with the enforcement of these 
controversial federal policies, notwithstanding the real federalism harms that would 
result. 
Rather than ignore these harms or dismiss them out of hand as insignificant, I 
suggest that federal cooperation laws be subject to a type of intermediate review (in 
between the rational basis review given to Congress’ exercise of its Spending Clause 
power and the strict scrutiny used to strike down federal laws that commandeer state 
processes).  This review would essentially be a balancing test:  a court would weigh the 
local sovereign interest in self-regulation against the federal interest in mandatory 
cooperation.  Because this intermediate review gives voice to both local and federal 
sovereign interests, it is more likely to reach the correct federalism result. 
 In Section II, I use the conflict between the 1996 laws and the local laws as a case 
study to understand the potential harm to federalism interests caused by federal 
cooperation statutes.  In Section III, I explain why existing case law, with its 
commandeering/preemption distinction, does not adequately consider the federalism 
harms caused by federal cooperation statutes.  I then suggest in Section IV a new 
 
19 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(c), 844 (2000) criminalizes the possession of marijuana, regardless of intended 
purpose.  And Senator Sam Brownback has proposed legislation that would criminalize any form of human 
cloning.  The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions on 
March 17, 2005.  Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2005, S. 658, 109th Cong.  (2005).  Finally, doctors 
who knowingly prescribe medication for an assisted suicide can be held criminally liable under the 
Controlled Substances Act.  21 U.S.C. § 842(2) (2000).      
8framework for analysis that subjects federal cooperation laws to an intermediate 
balancing test. 
 
II.  Federalism Harms of Cooperation Laws:  Immigration as a Case Study
What result, from a federalism perspective, when the federal government requires 
local governments to cooperate in the enforcement of a federal scheme?  Using 
immigration law enforcement as a case study, I argue that federal cooperation laws like 
the 1996 laws impose substantial federalism harms, both to the local governments subject 
to their mandate and to the system of federalism as a whole. 
A.  The Significance of Cooperation
In common usage, cooperation is defined as “the process of working together to 
the same end; assistance, especially by ready compliance with requests.”20 Cooperation 
has also been defined as a “joint operation” or “common effort or labor.”21 These 
definitions share common elements:  that those who cooperate with each other agree on a 
common goal and voluntarily join their efforts to reach that goal. 
Framing this immigration debate as one about cooperation is appropriate for 
several reasons.  First, cooperation accurately describes what the federal government 
seeks from local governments.  Because of Tenth Amendment constraints, the federal 
government can’t force local governments to enforce federal immigration laws (e.g., to 
arrest those who are illegally present).22 So, short of exercising its Spending Clause 
 
20 THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 378 (Elizabeth J. Jewell & Frank Abate, eds., 2001).  
21 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 501 
(Philip Babcock Gove, ed., 2002). 
22 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down a federal law that required state officers 
to conduct background checks on potential gun buyers).  Tenth Amendment issues and the 
preemption/commandeering distinction is discussed further in Section III, infra.
9powers to obtain that joint enforcement, the federal government is limited to seeking 
local governments’ voluntary cooperation.  When the cooperation is not forthcoming at 
the local government level, the 1996 laws require that local government employees who 
want to assist in immigration law enforcement be allowed to do so.   
The most obvious form of cooperation protected by the 1996 laws is the ability of 
a local government employee to report undocumented individuals to federal immigration 
authorities.23 Other possible forms of protected cooperation:  a local employee who 
suspects that an individual using local government services (e.g., school enrollment or 
medical care) is undocumented would be able to contact federal authorities to verify the 
individual’s immigration status (even though legal status may not be a requirement to use 
the services), or a local employee could inquire about the immigration status of the same 
individual and compile that information for later transmission to federal authorities.24 
Second, cooperation has symbolic aspects that are relevant to this analysis.  As 
stated previously, cooperation between parties implies agreement and shared goals.  
Local governments that have passed non-cooperation laws did so, in large part, to signal 
their disagreement with federal immigration policies.  Some disagree with the 
immigration policies themselves.  The majority of the local governments, however, have 
a narrower disagreement:  that local governments should not be involved with 
immigration law enforcement.   
 
23 Under the restructuring that occurred after 9/11, the federal agency that would receive such reports is 
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the agency responsible for interior (versus 
border) enforcement of immigration laws.  See http://www.ice.gov/graphics/about/index.htm (last visited 
June 21, 2005). 
24 The language of the 1996 laws, particularly §642 of IIRIRA, supports the protection of these forms of 
cooperation.  However, because there has been so little litigation of the 1996 laws, there has not been any 
judicial interpretation of what specific forms of cooperation are federally protected. 
10
The various reasons that local governments passed non-cooperation laws is 
discussed in more detail, infra,25 but one reason—maintaining effective relations with 
immigrant communities—is particularly relevant to this discussion of the symbolic 
importance of cooperation.  Local governments that are concerned that their immigrant 
communities will go completely underground (cutting off contact with the police, health 
department, schools and other government agencies) if the immigrants hear rumors that 
local governments may be cooperating with federal immigration enforcement will want to 
signal strongly to these communities that they are not so cooperating.26 So for various 
reasons, local governments with non-cooperation laws want to signal to the federal 
government and their own local constituencies that they are not “working together [with 
the federal government] to the same end” of immigration law enforcement. 
 For the federal government, there is also important symbolism to the cooperation 
it seeks.  Even if the 1996 laws do not result in many cases of actual cooperation, the 
appearance of local government cooperation may bolster federal enforcement efforts.  
Those who are considering entering the U.S. illegally may be deterred if they believe that 
all police, teachers and other local government employees will cooperate in immigration 
law enforcement.  For those who are already here without authorization, the possibility of 
local cooperation substantially increases the cost of their illegal presence.  Furthermore, if 
the 1996 laws successfully preempt the non-cooperation laws so that the non-cooperation 
laws are removed from the books, then there at least appears to be unified support among 
 
25 See Section II(D)(2), infra.
26 Says Austin, Texas, Police Assistant Chief Rudy Landeros, “Our officers will not, and let me stress this 
because it is very important, our officers will not stop, detain, or arrest anyone solely based on their 
immigration status.  Period.”  Austin Police Won’t Arrest People Only for Immigration Status (KEYE CBS 
Austin television broadcast, Apr. 5, 2002), at http://www.immigrationforum.org/currentissues/articles/ 
043002_foi.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2004). 
11
local governments for federal immigration policies, which may have important political 
implications.27 
B.  The Roots of Non-Cooperation
The attacks of 9/11 focused the nation’s attention on immigration law 
enforcement and brought the issue of local-federal cooperation to the fore.  But questions 
about whether local authorities should enforce immigration laws or whether they can 
refuse to cooperate in that enforcement—the issue here--long predates 9/11.  For about as 
long as the U.S. has had an immigration policy, there has been debate about the 
appropriate roles of the local and federal governments in its enforcement.28 And so, to 
understand the impact of the federal cooperation laws on immigration enforcement, it is 
important to understand the historical context of this local-federal debate. 
 1. Nature of the Immigration Power
Courts and scholars largely agree that the power to regulate immigration is 
exclusively federal.29 The immigration power is not expressly enumerated in the 
Constitution, but the commonly understood sources of the power—the Naturalization 
Clause, the Foreign Affairs Clauses, the Commerce Clause, and the nation’s status as a 
sovereign—all suggest that the power is an exclusively federal one.30 Moreover, the 
immigration power’s presumed effect on foreign affairs further supports its 
characterization as an exclusive federal power, because of the nation’s need to speak with 
 
27 For example, the removal of non-cooperation laws would eliminate an important symbol of success for 
immigrant advocates and perhaps slow the momentum of their efforts. 
28 See Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position:  Why Inviting Local 
Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 976-87 (2004). 
29 “Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”  De Canas v. Bica, 424 
U.S. 351, 354 (1976).   
30 See Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal 
Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 532-52 (2001). 
12
one voice on these issues.31 For these reasons, the Supreme Court has struck down state 
laws that attempted to regulate immigration, while upholding substantially similar federal 
ones.32 
There is less consensus about whether the power to enforce immigration laws is 
exclusively federal.  The courts that have considered the question have split:  the Ninth 
Circuit held that local governments can enforce criminal but not civil immigration laws,33 
while the Eighth and Tenth Circuits allow local enforcement when authorized by state 
law (even when federal law appears to prohibit such enforcement).34 Even the executive 
branch has changed its position on this issue.  In a 1996 memorandum, the Department of 
Justice opined that local governments may enforce criminal, but not civil, provisions of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act.35 But in 2002, DOJ reversed itself, declaring in an 
unreleased opinion that states and cities have “inherent authority” as sovereigns to 
enforce immigration laws.36 
31 See Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (“In the United States this [immigration] power is 
vested in the national government, to which the Constitution has committed the entire control of 
international relations, in peace as well as in war.”) 
32 Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376-77 (1971) (striking down state laws that denied 
welfare benefits to resident aliens as violations of the Equal Protection Clause and encroachments on the 
federal government’s exclusive immigration power) with Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 87 (1976) 
(upholding federal law that limited Medicare eligibility to permanent residents with continuous residence). 
33 Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475-76 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999). 
34 See United States v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298, 1301 n.3 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that a state 
trooper has “general investigatory authority to inquire into possible immigration violations”); United States 
v. Perez-Sosa, 164 F.3d 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding state trooper’s arrest of defendant for 
transporting illegal aliens). 
35 Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice, for the United States 
Attorney for the Southern District of California, Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending 
Illegal Aliens II.B. (Feb. 5, 1996), at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/1996opinions.htm [hereinafter 1996 DOJ 
Memo on Local Assistance]. 
36 See footnote 1, supra.
13
 2. Sanctuary laws:
On the flip side of whether local governments may enforce immigration laws is 
the question at issue here:  may local governments refuse to cooperate with enforcement 
of those laws?  This was the question at issue in the sanctuary movement of the 1980s, 
when local governments passed laws that prohibited their employees from participating 
in or cooperating with immigration law enforcement.  In many cases, those sanctuary 
laws are the roots of today’s current non-cooperation laws. 
The sanctuary movement was originally started by churches and other private 
institutions, which believed that Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and other nationals of U.S. 
allies were wrongly being denied asylum to further American foreign policy objectives. 37 
Working within a private network, these institutions declared themselves to be 
“sanctuaries” where undocumented persons seeking asylum could find safe shelter.  
Besides shelter, participants in the movement also provided asylum seekers with medical 
care, bond money (for those arrested), and legal assistance.38 
Cities and states also joined the movement, passing “sanctuary laws”39 that 
declared asylum seekers could remain in their boundaries without fear of arrest by local 
law enforcement for immigration violations.  Many of the sanctuary policies also 
contained provisions that prohibited local police from reporting immigration information 
to or otherwise cooperating with federal immigration enforcement.40 
37 STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1206-07 (4TH ED. 2005). 
38 SANCTUARY: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR UNDERSTANDING AND PARTICIPATING IN THE CENTRAL 
AMERICAN REFUGEES’ STRUGGLE 15-17 (Gary MacEoin, ed., 1985). 
39 Though I refer to sanctuary “laws,” it is important to note that the measures passed by cities and states 
during the sanctuary movement took various legal forms: laws, resolutions, ordinances, or executive orders.  
I discuss the significance of these legal forms in the context of non-cooperation laws in Section II.C.2.A, 
infra.   
40 See, e.g., TAKOMA PARK, MD., MUNICIPAL CODE § 9.04.030 (2004), at 
http://207.176.67.2/code/Takoma_Park_Municipal_Code/Title_9/04/index.html (Dec. 13, 2004) (“no agent, 
14
At the height of the movement, approximately 23 cities and four states 
participated.41 Cities that passed sanctuary laws included Rochester, NY; Minneapolis, 
Minn.; Seattle, and Chicago; states that passed such laws included New Mexico, 
Massachusetts and New York.42 
Typical of the sanctuary laws was that passed by Takoma Park, Maryland in 
1985.  In a resolution, Takoma Park expressed its belief that the United States has a 
responsibility under international law not to deport refugees back to places of 
persecution, that the United States violated international law by denying asylum to 
Guatemalan and Salvadoran refugees, and finally, that the individual volunteers in the 
sanctuary movement and the movement as a whole deserved government support.43 In its 
law, Takoma Park prohibited its employees from assisting or cooperating with the INS in 
any investigation of immigration violations, from inquiring about the citizenship status of 
any resident, and from releasing the citizenship status of any resident to the INS.44 
3.  Federal Reaction:  1996 Cooperation Laws
The federal reaction to the sanctuary laws and the sanctuary movement as a whole 
was rather muted.  While it prosecuted individual participants in the movement for 
smuggling aliens and other violations of the immigration laws,45 the federal government 
 
officer, or employee of the City of Takoma Park, in the performance of official duties, shall release to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service any information regarding the citizenship or residency of any City 
resident”); CITY OF CAMBRIDGE RESOLUTION (Apr. 8, 1985) (on file with author) (“no department or 
employee of the City of Cambridge will violate established or future sanctuaries by officially assisting or 
voluntarily cooperating with investigations or arrest procedures, public or clandestine, relating to alleged 
violations of immigration law by refugees from El Salvador, Guatemala or Haiti”).   
41 Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and State Sanctuary Declarations: Innocuous Symbolism or Improper 
Dictates?, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 297 (1989).   
42 Id. at 311-16.   
43 Council Res. 1985-29, (City of Takoma Park, Md. 1985). 
44 TAKOMA PARK, MD., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 9.04 (2004).   
45 See Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or a Dangerous Misinterpretation of 
an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 747, 748 n.15 (1986); Carro, Municipal and State 
Sanctuary Declarations,  supra note 41, at 326. 
15
never sued to challenge the sanctuary laws that were passed to support the movement.  To 
be sure, the executive branch criticized the laws,46 but it never challenged any of the laws 
in court.  
 The sole legal challenge to sanctuary policies came instead from Congress in the 
form of the 1996 laws.  The legislative history of both 1996 laws made clear that the laws 
were intended to nullify the sanctuary policies.  Acknowledging that “various localities 
have enacted laws preventing local officials from disclosing the immigration status of 
individuals to INS,” the legislative history of Section 434 expressed the intent to preempt 
these sanctuary laws and open communication between local governments and federal 
immigration authorities.47 In the Conference Report accompanying the bill, however, 
the conferees acknowledged that Section 434 does not require, “in and of itself,” any 
local government to communicate with federal immigration authorities.48 
Similarly, in passing Section 642 of IIRIRA (Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act), Congress emphasized the benefits of open 
communication between local governments and federal authorities, restrictive local laws 
notwithstanding.  As the Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee accompanying the 
Senate Bill explained, the “acquisition, maintenance, and exchange of immigration-
related information by State and local agencies is consistent with, and potentially of 
 
46 When asked about the sanctuary law passed by the Los Angeles City Council, INS spokesperson 
commented, “We’re certainly not in favor of the resolution.  It tends to encourage illegal immigration.”  
Still, “it’s more a moral problem than a practical one.”  American Notes Los Angeles: Lashing out at 
“Sanctuary,” TIME MAG., Dec. 16, 1985, available at 1985 WLNR 830835. 
47 Section 434 was designed to “prevent any State or local law, ordinance, executive order, policy, 
constitutional provision, or decision of any Federal or State court that prohibits or in any way restricts any 
communication between State and local officials and the INS.”  H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-725, at 383 
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2771. 
48 Id.
16
considerable assistance to, the Federal regulation of immigration and the achieving of the 
purposes and objectives of the Immigration and Nationality Act.”49 
By 1996, however, the practical impact of the sanctuary movement had 
diminished because its intended beneficiaries, Guatemalans and Salvadorans, became 
eligible for special refugee consideration.50 And so despite the obvious conflict between 
the 1996 laws and the sanctuary laws that local governments continued to keep on their 
books, there was little interest on either side in hashing out the legal effects of that 
conflict.   
The one spark of litigation involving the 1996 laws was an action brought by the 
city of New York, challenging the constitutionality of the laws.51 At that time, New York 
had in effect Executive Order 124, prohibiting city employees from voluntarily providing 
immigration status information to federal authorities except under limited 
circumstances.52 Within weeks of the 1996 laws taking effect, the Giuliani 
administration filed a lawsuit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.  The city raised 
two constitutional objections to the 1996 laws:  (1) the laws violate the Tenth 
Amendment because they force New York City to cooperate in federal regulation of 
aliens and interfere with the City’s authority to control the use of confidential information 
and determine the duties of its employees.  (2) The laws also violate the Guarantee 
Clause of the Constitution by interfering with the City’s chosen form of government.53 
49 S.REP. NO. 104-249, at 19-20 (1996). 
50 LEGOMSKY, supra note 37, at 1207. 
51 See City of New York v. United States, 971 F.Supp. 789 (S.D. N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 
1999).  
52 The circumstances were limited to a written release by the alien to verify immigration status, a legal 
requirement that such status be disclosed (perhaps as an eligibility requirement to receive a government 
benefit), or a suspicion that the alien is engaged in criminal activity.  City of New York Exec. Order No. 
124 (Aug. 1989), cited in City of New York, 179 F.3d at 31-32. 
53 See City of New York, 179 F.3d at 33.  
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The Second Circuit rejected these claims, upholding the constitutionality of the 1996 
laws.54 
C.  Non-Cooperation Laws Post 9/11:
Today’s non-cooperation laws were largely defined by the attacks on 9/11.  As 
discussed previously, many non-cooperation laws can trace their roots to the sanctuary 
movement of the 1980s, but it was the 9/11 attacks that refocused the nation’s attention 
on the issue of local enforcement of immigration laws.  As the country engaged in 
impassioned debate about what our immigration laws should be, there was also similarly 
heated debate about who should enforce those laws.   
1.   Federal Push for Local Enforcement:
The federal government, as noted previously,55 made a concerted push after 9/11 
to get local governments involved in the enforcement of immigration laws.  First, to try to 
remove some of the legal ambiguity about enforcement authority,56 the Office of Legal 
 
54 For more about the Second Circuit’s reasoning, see note 146 and accompanying text.  In response, the 
City in 2003 revoked Executive Order 124 and issued Executive Orders 34 and 41.  Rather than explicitly 
prohibit the transmission of immigration information to federal authorities (a “don’t tell” policy), Executive 
Order 34 (as amended by Executive Order 41) prohibits City employees from inquiring about immigration 
status in the first place except under limited circumstances (a “don’t ask” policy).  City of New York Exec. 
Order No. 34 (May 13, 2003) at http://friendsfw.org/Immigrant/NYC/NYC_Exec_Order_34_051303.htm 
(July 10, 2005) [hereinafter EO 34] as amended by City of New York Exec. Order No. 41 (Sept. 2003) at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/imm/downloads/pdf/exe_order_41.pdf (July 10, 2005) [hereinafter EO 41].  As to 
the disclosure of immigration status information, EO 41 first provides that immigration information should 
be treated like all other confidential information (e.g. sexual orientation and status as a domestic violence 
victim) and should not be disclosed except under limited circumstances.  Id.  EO 41 also provides for 
disclosure of individual immigration status if the individual is suspected of criminal activity “other than 
mere status as an undocumented alien” or if disclosure is necessary to investigate “potential terrorist 
activity.”  Id. 
55 See notes 1-3 and accompanying text, supra.
56 The ambiguity focused on a preemption question:  whether Congress intended for local governments to 
enforce all immigration laws or just criminal immigration laws.  Engaging in a preemption analysis, the 
Ninth Circuit, in Gonzales v. City of Peoria, held that Congress intended to preempt local enforcement of 
civil immigration provisions because those provisions constitute such a pervasive regulatory scheme.  
However, because the criminal immigration provisions are so “few in number and relatively simple in their 
terms,” the Ninth Circuit concluded that there is room for concurrent local enforcement of these provisions.  
Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475-76 (9th Cir. 1983).  Citing to Gonzales, DOJ in a 1996 
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Counsel within DOJ authored a legal memo opining that states have “inherent authority” 
as sovereigns to enforce immigration laws.57 With this inherent authority, according to 
DOJ, states (and their component local police forces) could voluntarily arrest individuals 
who have violated criminal or civil immigration laws and then transfer them to the 
custody of federal immigration officials.58 
Attorney General Ashcroft and other DOJ representatives also held press 
conferences and made presentations, encouraging local governments to enforce 
immigration laws as part of “our narrow anti-terrorism mission.”59 Moreover, DOJ 
signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with at least two states, authorizing them to 
jointly enforce immigration laws with DOJ.60 
Finally, members of Congress have drafted legislation to financially reward those 
local governments willing to enforce immigration laws and financially penalize those 
refusing to do so.  In 2003, Rep. Charles Norwood (R-GA) introduced the CLEAR Act 
(Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal), which proposed to provide $1 
billion in federal funding each fiscal year to those local governments who agree to 
 
opinion, agreed, making the same civil/criminal provision.  1996 DOJ Memo on Local Assistance, supra 
note 35, at II.B. 
57 See footnote 1 and accompanying text. 
58 The distinction between civil and criminal immigration provisions is that the committing the former may 
result in deportation, while committing the latter may result in a sentence in a U.S. prison.  DAVID 
WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL § 14-1 (5th ed. 
2005). 
59 See  footnote 2 and accompanying text. 
60 The states that signed MOUs are Florida and Alabama.  State, Local Law Enforcement Get Support to 
Enforce Immigration Laws, supra note 4.  MOUs are permitted by 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1)-(3) (2000), which 
provides in relevant part:  “[T]he Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a State, or any 
political subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who is 
determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in 
relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States (including the 
transportation of such aliens across State lines to detention centers), may carry out such function at the 
expense of the State or political subdivision and to the extent consistent with State and local law.” 
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enforce immigration laws.61 The CLEAR Act also required states which receive federal 
reimbursement under SCAAP (State Criminal Alien Assistance Program) for the 
detention of criminal aliens or who want to receive additional federal funds under the 
CLEAR Act to pass laws permitting local enforcement of immigration laws.62 The 
CLEAR Act died in Congress, but its component provisions have resurfaced in other 
legislation currently being considered by Congress.63 
2.   Non-Cooperation Laws:
Reacting to these federal initiatives, many local governments built upon their 
previous sanctuary laws; other local governments passed entirely new non-cooperation 
laws.64 
(a)  Form of Non-Cooperation Laws:
Though I refer to non-cooperation “laws,” it is important to note that the measures 
passed by local governments to limit their cooperation with immigration law enforcement 
take various legal forms.  In descending order of frequency, local governments have 
 
61 H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003). 
62 Id. 
63 For example, the CLEAR provision that provided financial assistance to state and local police agencies 
enforcing immigration law (section 106) has now been attached to the DHS Authorization Bill in slightly 
revised form.  H.R. 1817, 109th Cong. § 109 (2005).  And the CLEAR provision that affirmed the inherent 
authority of state personnel to enforce immigration law (section 101) has also been attached to the DHS 
Authorization Bill.  H.R. 1817, 109th Cong. § 520 (2005).  The House passed the bill on May 18, 2005 and 
the Senate has referred it to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.     
64 An example of the former method is San Francisco, which passed a resolution in 1985 declaring “the 
City and County of San Francisco [to be] a City and County of Refuge for Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
refugees.”  The resolution directed that “City departments shall not discriminate against Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan refugees because of immigration status.”  Ignatius Bau, Cities of Refuge:  No Federal 
Preemption of Ordinances Restricting Government Cooperation with the INS, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 50, 52-53 
(1994).  In 1989, San Francisco passed an ordinance that more generally prohibits city employees from 
assisting in the enforcement of immigration laws or gathering or disseminating information about 
immigration status, unless required by law.  SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §12H.2.c 
(2005).  After 9/11, the Board of Supervisors passed a resolution urging the San Francisco Chief of Police 
to remind all local police officers that the city has an ordinance against enforcing immigration laws.  Bd. of 
Supervisors Res. 389-02, (City and County of San Francisco 2002).   
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passed their measures as (1) resolutions, (2) ordinances or laws, (3) executive orders, or 
(4) departmental orders or policies.65 
For present purposes, the relevant inquiry is the binding nature of these various 
forms, because arguably, there is only preemption (or the potential for preemption) if, in 
fact, these non-cooperation laws are enforced by the local governments that pass them.66 
Ordinances (at the municipal level) and laws (at the state level) are clearly binding, as 
legislation passed by a governing body.67 
Resolutions are also passed by legislative bodies (usually city councils or state 
legislatures), but their binding nature is less apparent.  Resolutions, which make up the 
bulk of the non-cooperation laws, are not traditionally equivalent to ordinances.  Rather, 
they are acts of a “temporary character,” “sufficient for council action on ministerial, 
administrative or executive matters.”68 
The limitation on local cooperation in immigration law enforcement is not a 
ministerial or administrative matter and so would appear to exceed the boundaries of a 
proper resolution.  However, in the absence of a contrary statute or charter provision, 
courts will often accept a resolution in place of an ordinance, subject matter 
notwithstanding.  Moreover, if a resolution is adopted with the same formalities as an 
ordinance (e.g., notice of meeting time and location, roll call vote, and recording of 
 
65 NILC ANNOTATED CHART, supra note 10. 
66 Even if some of the non-cooperation laws are not binding (e.g., advisory opinions), they might still run 
afoul of the 1996 laws, both of which broadly address restrictions, as well as prohibitions, on information 
exchange.  Section 434 states, “no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way 
restricted. . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2000) (emphasis added).  Section 642 similarly provides that government 
entities or officials “may not prohibit, or in any way restrict . . .”  Id. § 1373 (emphasis added).  Even a 
non-binding local law might be preempted as an impermissible restriction. 
67 CHARLES S. RHYNE, THE LAW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS § 8.1, at 115 (1980).  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines an ordinance as “[a]n authoritative law or decree; especially a municipal regulation.  
Municipal governments can pass ordinances on matters that the state government allows to be regulated at 
the local level.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1132 (8th ed. 2004). 
68 RHYNE, supra note 67, § 8.1, at 115. 
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votes),69 then courts often treat the resolution as having the same legal effect as an 
ordinance.  Here, the majority of the non-cooperation laws that were passed in the form 
of resolutions were passed with the requisite formalities and thus should be treated as 
having the same legal effect as ordinances.70 
As executive actions, executive orders and police policies should also be treated 
as binding.  Executive orders are orders issued by a mayor or governor to direct the 
actions of executive agencies or other government officials and have the force of law.71 
Departmental orders or policies (which make up only a small number of the non-
cooperation laws) reflect policy decisions made by the department head, usually the chief 
of police.  The process for forming orders or policies is more informal than executive 
orders, but because policies control the actions of police officers and other local 
government employees, the policies should also be considered binding for purposes of 
this analysis. 
(b)  Substantive provisions of Non-Cooperation Laws:
The substantive provisions of the non-cooperation laws are of five types.  Often, 
non-cooperation laws contain more than one type of substantive provision.  From 
broadest to most specific, the types of substantive provisions are: 
 
69 OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 61, at 209, §§ 62-64 (2nd ed. 
2001). 
70 See, e.g., Philadelphia Resolution (May 29, 2003) (passed with roll call vote) available at 
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12737&c=207 (last visited June 26, 2005); Sitka, 
Alaska Resolution 03-886 (Sep. 23, 2003) (passed with roll call vote) available at 
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=13890&c=207 (last visited June 26, 2005); Talent, 
Oregon Resolution 03-642-R (Apr. 2, 2003) (passed with roll call vote) available at 
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12268&c=207 (last visited June 26, 2005). 
71 Michael S. Herman, Gubernatorial Executive Orders, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 987, 989-90 (1999); BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 610 
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(i)  No discrimination based on citizenship status:
(ii) No enforcement of immigration laws:
(iii)No enforcement of civil immigration laws:
(iv) No inquiry about citizenship status:
(v) No notifying federal immigration authorities:
(i)  No discrimination:
This provision is the most broadly worded, prohibiting local employees (including 
law enforcement) from discriminating in the provision of government services on the 
basis of citizenship status, race, or national origin.  The provision is often accompanied 
by language emphasizing the city’s commitment to equal protection generally.  This type 
of provision usually does not make a specific reference to the enforcement of 
immigration laws.72 
(ii)  No enforcement of immigration laws:
This provision is the most common among the non-cooperation laws.  Local 
governments operating under this type of provision prohibit their police and other 
employees from using local government resources to enforce immigration laws.  Often, 
the prohibition is accompanied by statements that the enforcement of immigration laws is 
a federal, not local, responsibility.  Sometimes, the local government may specify what it 
considers to be immigration law enforcement, but often, this provision is a stand-alone 
provision, without any further explanation.73 
72 For example, Minneapolis has a resolution that, inter alia, directs the police department not to engage in 
profiling based on race, ethnicity, citizenship or religious or political affiliation. MINNEAPOLIS RESOLUTION 
2003R-109 (April 4, 2003) available at 
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12291&c=207 (June 26, 2005).  The resolution 
focuses more generally on criticizing the USA Patriot Act and other federal legislation perceived to 
threaten civil rights. 
73 Alaska’s resolution passed in May 2003 is an example of the latter, stand-alone provision: “[A]n agency 
or instrumentality of the state may not use state resources or institutions for the enforcement of federal 
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(iii)  No enforcement of civil immigration laws:
This type of provision is even more specific in its restriction:  local government 
employees may not cooperate with the enforcement of immigration laws when the only 
immigration violation alleged is illegal presence or other civil violation.74 However, (and 
some local laws make this explicit), local government employees may enforce criminal 
immigration laws or may inquire about immigration status when that status is relevant to 
a criminal investigation.75 
(iv)  No inquiry about citizenship status:
Moving beyond a prohibition on the enforcement of immigration laws, some local 
governments restrict their employees from even asking about citizenship status in the first 
place.76 Drafters of this type of provision clearly had the 1996 laws in mind:  by 
preventing government employees from obtaining immigration status information, local 
governments can (in most cases) prevent these employees from reporting undocumented 
 
immigration matters, which are the responsibility of the federal government.”  ALASKA JOINT HOUSE 
RESOLUTION 22 (May 2003), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=13141&c=207 (June 26, 2005).  Syracuse, New 
York’s resolution, passed in September 2003, similarly calls on its police department to refrain from 
enforcing immigration laws, “except when specifically requested by federal officials in relation to 
particularized suspicion of criminal activity.”  SYRACUSE RESOLUTION 37-R (Sep. 2003) available at 
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=13528&c=207 (June 26, 2005). 
74 Requirements for illegal presence are laid out in 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2000).  The difference between civil 
and criminal immigration violations is discussed in footnote 58, supra.
75 An example of a local government that enforces this time of provision is the District of Columbia which 
has a general order that prohibits its officers from inquiring about immigration status for the sole purpose of 
determining whether an individual has violated civil immigration laws. However, officers may inquire 
about immigration status if they are investigating criminal smuggling and other criminal immigration 
violations.  Memorandum Reaffirming District of Columbia General Police Order 201.26 (July 28, 2003) at  
http://mpdc.dc.gov/mpdc/cwp/view,a,1247,q,551596,mpdcNav_GID,1543.asp (June 25, 2003). 
76 An example of this type of provision is the resolution passed by Durham, North Carolina in October 
2003, which states that no city officer or employee is permitted to inquire into the immigration status of any 
person or engage in activities designed to discover that immigration status unless otherwise required as part 
of his/her duties or by law or court order.  See Durham Resolution 9046 (October 20, 2003) at 
http://www.ci.durham.nc.us/agendas/minutes/cc_minutes_10_20_03.pdf. (June 22, 2005). 
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persons to federal immigration authorities, achieving non-cooperation without directly 
violating the 1996 laws.77 
(v)  No notifying federal immigration authorities:
The most specific of the five types of non-cooperation provisions, this provision 
prohibits local government employees from reporting any person’s immigration status to 
federal immigration authorities.  Sometimes the provision specifies the circumstances 
where the prohibition applies:  when the person is a material witness to a crime, is 
seeking medical treatment, or is involved in a family disturbance, minor traffic offense, 
or minor misdemeanor.78 And often the provision provides exceptions when reporting is 
allowed:  when the person consents in writing, when immigration status is an eligibility 
condition for participation in a federal program, or the transmission is otherwise required 
by law.79 
(c)  Preemption of Non-Cooperation Laws
The language of the 1996 laws makes clear that Congress intended to preempt 
conflicting local laws.  The question then becomes, what is the scope of that preemption?  
Applying principles of express and implied preemption, it is apparent that at least one 
category of non-cooperation provisions—no notifying federal immigration authorities—
is preempted; arguably, the remaining categories of non-cooperation provisions are also 
preempted by the 1996 laws.80 
77 The legal effect of “no inquiry” laws is discussed further in Section II.C.2.C, infra.
78 CHANDLER POLICE DEPARTMENT GENERAL ORDER E-17 (eff. Mar. 1, 1999, revised July 1, 1999) at 
http://www.chandlerpd.com/gos/E17forgn.pdf (July 10, 2005). 
79 New York City, as discussed in note 54, supra, has this type of provision in its non-cooperation law.  The 
state of Maine has a similar policy.  See Maine Exec. Order (April 9, 2004) at 
http://www.maine.gov/governor/baldacci/news/executive-orders/EX_ORDER_4_9_04.doc (June 26, 
2005). 
80 The broadest category of non-cooperation provisions—no discrimination based on citizenship status--is 
not preempted by the 1996 laws.  See note 90, infra.
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 The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution states that the “Constitution and the 
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
Supreme Law of the Land.”81 If there is a conflict between federal and local law, the 
Supremacy Clause resolves that conflict in favor of federal law.82 Because of federalism 
concerns, the starting assumption in preemption analysis is that a local law is valid unless 
it is “the clear and manifest purpose of Congress” to preempt it.83 
The Supreme Court has identified two situations in which federal preemption 
occurs:  (1) express preemption where Congress explicitly states in a federal statute its 
intent to preempt local law or (2) implied preemption where Congress’ preemptive intent 
is implicit in the federal statute’s structure and purpose.84 
(i)  Express Preemption:
Congress’ intent to preempt conflicting local laws is clear in the identical 
introductory language of both 1996 laws (“Notwithstanding any other provision of 
Federal, State, or local law. . .”)85 and in the substance of the laws themselves.  Section 
434 and 642 both prohibit local governments from preventing their employees from 
voluntarily sending any individual’s immigration status to or receiving that information 
from federal authorities.86 And Section 642 further prohibits local governments from 
restricting their employees’ ability to maintain immigration status information or to 
exchange that information with other state or local government agencies.87 
81 U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl.2. 
82 Gade v. Nat’l  Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (102). 
83 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).   
84 Gade, 505 U.S. at 98. 
85 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373, 1644 (2000). 
86 Id. §§ 1373, 1644. 
87 Id. § 1373.   
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What is the scope of this express preemption?  The obvious targets for express 
preemption are non-cooperation laws like that in San Francisco and Takoma Park, 
Maryland, that contain the most specific category of restriction—no notifying federal 
immigration authorities .88 Because the 1996 laws broadly address restrictions as well as 
prohibitions,89 arguably most of the remaining categories of non-cooperation provisions90 
could be expressly preempted as well if their directives restrict the ability of local 
government employees to cooperate with federal immigration authorities.  For example, 
if enforcing immigration laws (or specifically, enforcing civil immigration laws) is 
defined to include reporting an undocumented person to the federal authorities, 
maintaining information status information, or requesting such information, than local 
non-cooperation laws with these provisions—no enforcement of (civil) immigration 
laws—would be expressly preempted.  Similarly, if prohibiting local government 
employees from inquiring about citizenship status is interpreted as restricting their ability 
to cooperate with federal immigration authorities (because they are prohibited from 
obtaining the information that makes their cooperation possible), then those types of non-
cooperation laws are also expressly preempted. 
88 TAKOMA PARK, MD., MUNICIPAL CODE § 9.04.030 (2004), at 
http://207.176.67.2/code/Takoma_Park_Municipal_Code/Title_9/04/index.html (Dec. 13, 2004) (“No 
agent, officer or employee of the City, in the performance of official duties, shall release to the Immigration 
and Naturalization Services any information regarding the citizenship or residency status of any City 
resident.”); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12H.2 (2005) (“No department, agency, commission, 
officer or employee of the City and County of San Francisco shall use any City funds or resources to assist 
in the enforcement of federal immigration law or to gather or disseminate information regarding the 
immigration status of individuals in the City and County of San Francisco unless such assistance is required 
by federal or state statute, regulation or court decision.”). 
89 Section 434 states, “no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted. . .” 8 
U.S.C. § 1644 (emphasis added).  Section 642 similarly provides that government entities or officials “may 
not prohibit, or in any way restrict . . .”  Id. § 1373 (emphasis added).     
90 The broadest category of non-cooperation provision—no discrimination based on citizenship status—is 
not subject to preemption under either an express or implied preemption analysis.  Its broad directive to 
local government employees (essentially to respect equal protection principles in the provision of local 
government services) neither restricts communication with federal authorities, nor impedes federal 
immigration objectives. 
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(ii)  Implied Preemption:
There is also the plausible (albeit less persuasive) argument that three middle 
categories of non-cooperation provisions—no enforcement of immigration laws (or civil 
immigration laws) and no inquiry about citizenship status--are preempted under an 
implied preemption analysis.  Even in the absence of direct conflict between federal and 
local law, courts have been willing to imply preemption if the local law “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes or objectives of 
Congress.”91 
The crucial inquiry then becomes, what was Congress’ purpose in passing the 
1996 laws and are the non-cooperation laws consistent with that purpose?  As 
constitutional scholars have noted, a broadly defined federal purpose tends to lead to 
preemption, as local laws are more likely to interfere with that broad purpose.  A more 
narrowly defined federal purpose, on the other hand, is less likely to be inconsistent with 
local laws.92 
Narrowly defined, Congress’ purpose in passing the 1996 laws could be 
characterized as a desire to improve communication between local governments and 
federal immigration authorities.  Indeed, the legislative history of the 1996 laws supports 
this narrowly defined purpose.93 If Congress’ purpose is so defined, then the majority of 
non-cooperation laws would not be preempted because they do not explicitly prohibit that 
communication and thus are not “obstacle[s] to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes or objectives of Congress.” 
 
91 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (holding that a state cannot force aliens to register when the 
federal government already required such registration). 
92 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 398 (2d ed. 2002). 
93 See notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
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If Congressional purpose is broadly defined, however, then most, if not all, of the 
non-cooperation laws would likely be preempted.  Consider that Section 642 was passed 
as part of IIRIRA, one of the toughest crackdowns on illegal immigration in modern 
history.94 The Senate Report accompanying IIRIRA states that Congress’ purpose in 
passing the Act was to “increase control over immigration to the United States--
decreasing the number of persons becoming part of the U.S. population in violation of 
this country’s immigration law . . .; expediting the removal of excludable and deportable 
aliens, especially criminal aliens; and reducing the abuse of parole and asylum 
provisions.”95 With this background, it could be persuasively argued that Congress had 
broader purposes in passing Section 642:  (1) to facilitate the deportation of illegal 
immigrants and/or (2) to facilitate those deportations by recruiting local governments to 
enforce immigration laws.   
If Congress’ purposes are thus broadly defined, then arguably the three middle 
categories of non-cooperation provisions are preempted as obstacles to those purposes.  
Except for the broadest category of non-cooperation provisions (those that simply 
prohibit discrimination based on citizenship status),96 the substantive provisions in the 
remaining non-cooperation laws prohibit some or all forms of local involvement in 
 
94 IIRIRA also severely restricted the ability of legal immigrants to access the public benefits system.  8 
U.S.C. § 1624 (2000). 
95 S. REP. NO. 104-249, at 2 (1996).   
96 Because these provisions do not specifically prohibit immigration law enforcement, they do not hinder 
the goal of deporting illegal immigrants.  The provisions merely prohibit discrimination based on 
citizenship status, which can be interpreted as benefiting the categories of people who, though not citizens, 
are here legally (e.g., permanent residents, foreign tourists and students, and foreign workers with valid 
work visas). 
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immigration law enforcement.  These prohibitions hinder the deportation goal by making 
the detection and detaining of illegal immigrants more difficult.97 
The argument for implied preemption, however, is problematic for two related 
reasons.  First, as a doctrinal matter, implied preemption analysis is reserved for cases 
where the federal statute is silent as to any preemptive intent.98 Here, the 1996 laws 
expressly state an intent to preempt conflicting local law and then go on to state what 
local laws are preempted.  Second, as a policy matter, if the goal is to determine 
Congressional intent, it seems counterintuitive to graft an implied preemption analysis 
where Congress has already expressly stated its intent.  Congress has already 
demonstrated its ability and interest in preempting at least some non-cooperation laws; if 
it wanted to preempt the remaining laws, presumably it would have done so (or could still 
do so).  The more relevant inquiry would be to determine the scope of that express 
preemptive intent. 
D.  Federalism Harms of the 1996 Laws:
If, as predicted above, many of the non-cooperation laws currently on the books 
are preempted, the result will be substantial federalism harms, imposed on both local 
governments and the system of federalism as a whole.  By federalism harms, I mean 
harms to the values of federalism, to the underlying reasons why we care about balancing 
 
97 Given that Section 434 was passed as part of the Welfare Reform Act, Congress’ purpose could also be 
broadly defined as reducing illegal immigrants’ use of public benefits.  With this goal, however, the 
preemption argument would be hard to make: because illegal immigrants are not eligible for most public 
benefits anyway, it’s difficult to see how restrictions on local enforcement of immigration laws would 
affect their use of these benefits.  Moreover, other federal law already requires local case workers to verify 
the citizenship status of applicants before distributing benefits.  For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1611 prohibits 
granting “any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, 
food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit” to illegal immigrants with few 
exceptions.  Id. These narrow exceptions include disaster relief, immunizations, and some emergency 
health care.  Id.
98 “Preemption may be either express or implied. . .  Absent explicit preemptive language, we have 
recognized at least two types of implied preemption. . .”  Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (emphasis added). 
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power between the states and the federal government.  Those values, briefly stated, are to 
enhance democratic rule, prevent governmental tyranny, and encourage innovation 
among local governments.99 
1. Defining Federalism and Its Values
Federalism is a rich and complex topic, with its contours, implications and even 
its merits, the subject of much policy and academic debate.  Its widely accepted 
definition, by contrast, is simple:  the allocation of power between federal and state 
governments.100 Why do we care about correctly allocating power between the different 
levels of government?  Though the application of federalism principles in recent cases 
has often resulted in the boosting of state sovereignty,101 we value state sovereignty not 
as an end in itself, but for the positive effects that state sovereignty, correctly calibrated 
within our system of federalism, generates.  These positive effects are what I call 
“federalism values.” 
The values of federalism that are traditionally acknowledged by courts and 
scholars can be grouped into three categories:   enhancing democratic rule by creating 
governments more responsive to their constituents, preventing tyranny by diffusing 
 
99 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 504 (1995).  Others have 
categorized federalism values in different ways.  See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 Minn. 
L. Rev. 317, 386-404 (1997) (defining the values of federalism as including the encouragement of public 
participation in democracy, accountability, and experimentation among the states; protecting health, safety, 
welfare, and cultural and local diversity; and diffusing power to protect liberty). 
100 Chemerinsky, supra note 99, at 504.  See also Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: 
Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1563 (1994) (defining federalism as “the 
relationship between state and federal power”). 
101 See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (invalidating federal legislation that required state officers to conduct 
background checks on prospective gun buyers). 
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power between the federal and state levels of government, and encouraging policy 
innovation among states.102 
The first federalism value of enhancing democratic rule is complex, intertwining 
theories about representative government and federal structure.  The essence of this value 
is that federalism benefits democratic rule by creating local governments that, because of 
their smaller size and physical proximity to their constituents, are more responsive to 
those constituents’ needs.  Flowing from the creation of more responsive governments 
are the related benefits of (1) better government that reflects constituents’ diverse social 
values (a responsive local government is more likely to provide the specific governing 
policies that its constituents want), (2) increased political participation (because there is 
more opportunity for political involvement at the local levels), and (3) more political 
accountability (constituents involved in local political processes will more closely 
monitor government officials and demand accountability).103 
The second value--preventing tyranny--has been the focus of the Supreme Court’s 
recent federalism cases.  According to supporters of this value, federalism prevents 
tyranny by diffusing governmental power between the federal and local governments.  
“Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal 
Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a 
healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the 
 
102 Chemerinsky, supra note 99, at 525.  Professor Chemerinsky questions the descriptive accuracy of these 
values and suggests that the Supreme Court’s decisions protecting state sovereignty did so for reasons 
unrelated to federalism values.  Id. at 525-33.  For other critiques of federalism’s traditionally stated values, 
see Edward L. Rubin and Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 903 (1994) (arguing that federalism accomplishes none of the benefits touted by the Supreme Court). 
103 See Merritt, supra note 100, at 1573-74 (“For a nation composed of diverse racial, cultural, and religious 
groups, this opportunity to express multiple social values is essential.”). 
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risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”104 Any law that significantly expands the 
power of one level of government at the expense of the other level threatens federalism 
and thus, liberty.105 
The third value of policy innovation is often explained by reference to Justice 
Brandeis’s famous suggestion that the states “serve as a laboratory” to “try novel social 
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”106 Supporters of this 
federalism value point to anti-discrimination laws, no-fault insurance programs, and 
unemployment compensation as successful social programs that originated in states.107 
2. Analyzing Federalism Harms
By requiring local governments to cooperate with federal immigration law 
enforcement, the 1996 laws do significant harm to federalism values, particularly to the 
value of enhancing democratic rule. 
(a) Democratic Rule
The federalism value most threatened by the 1996 laws is that of enhancing 
democratic rule.  The local governments that have adopted non-cooperation laws 
exemplify the goals of democratic rule; these governments have decided, at the local 
level, that their communities are best served by not involving their police and other 
employees in immigration law enforcement.   
As discussed in more detail below, many local governments made this decision 
because of concerns that immigration cooperation would interfere with their police 
 
104 Printz, 521 U.S. at 921, citing to Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). 
105 In striking down a federal law that required state officers to conduct background checks on prospective 
gun buyers, the Court observed that “[t]he power of the Federal Government would be augmented 
immeasurably if it were able to impress into its service—and at no cost to itself—the police officers of the 
50 States.”  Id. at 922. 
106 New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
107 Merritt, supra note 100, at 1575. 
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powers to protect public safety, health, and welfare.  Federal preemption of the non-
cooperation laws would intrude significantly on local police powers and upend decisions 
made by local governments.  The result would be federally-directed policies that do not 
reflect local preferences and values.  Federal preemption would also, in this case, confuse 
the lines of political accountability, resulting in further harm to democratic rule. 
 (i)  Police Powers:
The term “police powers” is often used but defies precise definition.  A common 
formulation describes the police power as the power inherent in the states to pass 
reasonable laws to protect the health, safety, and general welfare of the people.108 
Notwithstanding the “police” component of its term, the police power is not limited to the 
security powers exercised by police departments.109 Acknowledging that the term is 
“neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition,” the Supreme Court 
has said that the legislature essentially determines what is or is not a police power.110 
The police power belongs to the states and is exercised by the state legislature, 
which can delegate its authority to cities and towns, as political subdivisions of the 
state.111 Examples of the varied police powers that have been recognized by the courts 
include the regulation of fishing along a local waterway,112 shooting a loose dog during a 
rabies scare,113 and establishing a board to license dry cleaners.114 
108 See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 316 (2004), citing to Matter of Yellowstone River, 832 P.2d 
1210 (Mont. 1992). 
109 James G. Hodge, The Role of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 12 J.L. & Health 309, 319 
(1998) citing to RUTH LOCKE ROETTINGER, THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE  POLICE POWER: A STUDY IN 
FEDERALISM 10 (Public Affairs Press)  (1957). 
110 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954) 
111 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law, supra note 108, at §324. 
112 In re Quinn, 110 Cal.Rptr. 881 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). 
113 Ruona v. City of Billings, 323 P.2d 29 (Mont. 1959). 
114 Jack Lincoln Shops v. State Dry Cleaners' Bd., 135 P.2d 332 (Okla. 1943). 
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(a) Public Safety Police Power:
If the 1996 laws preempt non-cooperation laws, local governments could 
experience substantial harm to their public safety police power.  Police chiefs and police 
associations have been some of the strongest advocates of non-cooperation laws because 
of public safety concerns.  Specifically, they argue that the involvement of their 
employees in immigration law enforcement (or even the perception of involvement) will 
hinder the ability to investigate and prevent crimes throughout their jurisdictions, as 
immigrant communities would shun contact with local police.115 
Immigrants, already vulnerable to extortion and organized crime, may refuse to 
report crimes or participate in criminal investigations, for fear of the immigration 
consequences.  Says Hillsboro, Oregon Police Chief Ron Louie, “We’re trying to build 
bridges with people living in fear. . . . If police officers become agents of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, . . .  their ability to deal with issues such as domestic violence 
and crime prevention will be severely curtailed.”116 Nor are the immigration concerns 
limited to illegal immigrants; because many immigrant families are mixed status (e.g., 
some children have legal status, while older siblings and parents may not), those here 
legally may be reluctant to contact the police because they don’t want to focus 
immigration attention on other family members who don’t have legal status.   
 
115 Lieutenant Tomas Padilla of the Hackensack, New Jersey, Police Department recounts an example of 
immigrant assistance: “[T]wo immigrants recently helped us solve a crime. . . . Maybe they were 
undocumented, we didn’t ask. But maybe that cooperation would not have occurred if we were forced to 
ask them for their immigration documents. . . . When immigrants fear they might be deported, they are not 
going to report the crime.” Miguel Perez, Ashcroft Comes to His Senses, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), 
June 10, 2002, at L01, available at 2002 WL 4661090. 
116 Rosario Daza, Helping People Without Papers, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Apr. 5, 2002, at C01, available 
at 2002 WL 3954137. 
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(b) Public Health Police Power:
Another reason frequently advanced by local governments for passing local laws 
is to protect their communities’ public health.  Immigrants may refuse to seek medical 
care when they have serious health problems if they believe that hospital workers will 
report them or their family members to federal immigration authorities.  Not only are the 
immigrants themselves at risk, but their family members, neighbors, co-workers, and 
others in the community are also at risk if the health problem is contagious.117 
(c) Public Welfare Police Power:
Communities where immigrants avoid contact with local government entities risk 
experiencing other public welfare harms.  For example, immigrant children who don’t go 
to school because their families fear deportation may become a permanent uneducated 
underclass, possibly leading to more crimes and increased dependence on public 
benefits.118 And if immigrants shun engagement with the government system altogether, 
then they are less likely to enforce their rights as employees, tenants, or consumers, 
leading to underenforcement of these important laws.119 Finally, if local authorities start 
 
117 For example, in response to a recent outbreak of rubella among Latinos living on Long Island, Suffolk 
County health officials organized a free vaccination clinic at a community center.  Emphasizing that health 
workers will not inquire about immigration status or require immigration documents, Dr. Mahfouz Zaki, 
the county’s director of public health stated, “We don’t do that in any program because we don’t want to 
scare people away.  We want people to come regardless of their status.”  Michele Salcedo, Seven Cases of 
Rubella on LI in Two Weeks, Follow Westchester Outbreak, NEWSDAY, May 27, 1998, at A26, available at 
1998 WLNR 583960. 
118 It was this concern about creating a permanent underclass that led the Supreme Court to strike down a 
Texas statute that denied public education to undocumented children.  “Children denied an education are 
placed at a permanent and insurmountable competitive disadvantage, for an uneducated child is denied 
even the opportunity to achieve. And when those children are members of an identifiable group, that group-
-through the State's action--will have been converted into a discrete underclass.”  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202, 234 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
119 A report issued by the City of New York Commission on Human Rights reported that many immigrants 
were reluctant to report their problems relating to employment, housing and public accommodations 
because they feared that contact with a government agency would lead to deportation.  In addition, the 
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enforcing immigration laws without proper training, they are prone to engage in racial 
profiling or other abuses of authority.120 
(ii)  Political Accountability:
Local constituents are also likely to experience significant political accountability 
confusion with the double-negative prohibition of the 1996 laws.  A constituent who 
hears that her neighbor or co-worker has been reported to federal immigration authorities 
by a city police officer or teacher is more likely to conclude that it is the city’s policy to 
engage in such reporting, rather than to attribute the reporting to a federal prohibition and 
the voluntary action of the individual city employee. 
(b) Tyranny
Preemption of non-cooperation laws also harms the federalism value of tyranny 
prevention by shifting power toward the federal government and thus upsetting the 
federal-local balance of power.  If the federal government can force local governments to 
cooperate in the enforcement of immigration laws, the federal government will be able to 
significantly expand its enforcement power (or at least the perception of that power), 
without paying any financial or political cost.121 Unlike Spending Clause cases where the 
federal government secures local acquiescence through fiscal enticements, the federal 
 
report stated that “fear of reprisals is very real to an immigrant community that is often mistrustful by 
virtue of previous experience with discrimination.”  JOHN E. BRANDON, CITY OF N. Y. COMM’N ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, A REPORT ON THE WIDESPREAD DISCRIMINATION AGAINST IMMIGRANTS AND PERSONS 
PERCEIVED AS IMMIGRANTS WHICH HAS RESULTED FROM THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT 
OF 1986, 22 (1989). 
120 Says Eric Nishimoto, spokesperson for the Ventura County Sheriff’s Department, “We’re not in favor of 
having our department being responsible for that function [immigration law enforcement] . . . . The number 
one risk is the potential for civil rights violations. Right now we’re involved in preventing any kind of 
racial profiling and this type of function could open us to that kind of risk. . . . We feel our officers are not 
equipped to make that kind of determination of who is legal.  Frank Moraga, Police Balk at Having to Do 
INS Work; Several Local Agencies Denounce Justice Plan, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Apr. 6, 2002, at B01, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, VNCST File. 
121 For discussion of why the federal government’s perceived enforcement power is so significant in the 
immigration context, see Section II.A, supra.
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government here does not have to expend any federal funds.  The federal government 
also does not have to expend any political capital to persuade local governments to 
cooperate, as it would have to do under a cooperative federalism scheme.122 
This expansion of federal power comes at the expense of local power.  Local 
governments required to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement lose powers 
that strike at the core of their sovereign status:  the ability to set the duties of their 
employees and to control the use of confidentially gained information.   
 Though the Supreme Court has largely abandoned any efforts to define exclusive 
spheres of state authority,123 it has recognized that states must retain certain core powers 
as part of their sovereign identities.124 And though it has not addressed the specific 
power at issue here (the power of local governments to set the duties of their employees), 
the Court has, in another context, acknowledged the important sovereignty implications 
of state control over its employees.  “Through the structure of its government, and the 
character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a 
sovereign.  It is obviously essential to the independence of the States, and to their peace 
and tranquility, that their power to prescribe the qualifications of their own officers. . . 
 
122 In a cooperative federalism program, Congress passes federal statutes that provide for state regulation or 
implementation to achieve federal goals.  An example of a cooperative federalism statute is the Clean Air 
Act:  “The federal government through the EPA determines the ends—the standards of air quality—but 
Congress has given the states the initiative and a broad responsibility regarding the means to achieve those 
ends through state implementation plans and timetables for compliance. . .”  Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. 
Gorsuch, 742 F.2d 1028, 1036-37 (7th Cir. 1984).  See also Phillip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional 
Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663 (2001) (noting that Congress has rejected 
the dual federalism model of regulation in favor of cooperative federalism programs). 
123 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985) (“We therefore 
now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal 
regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is ‘integral’ or 
‘traditional.’”) (overruling Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). 
124 See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761 (1982) (“The power of the States to make decisions 
and set policy is what gives the State its sovereign nature.  It would follow that the ability of a state 
legislative . . . body—which makes decisions and sets policy for the State as a whole—to consider and 
promulgate regulations of its choosing must be central to a State’s role in the federal system.”) 
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should be exclusive, and free from external interference, except so far as plainly provided 
by the Constitution of the United States.”  Lower courts have also recognized that control 
over government employees lies at the core of state sovereign powers.125 
But under the 1996 laws, local governments lose this important sovereign power.  
Those local governments that do not want their employees to cooperate with federal 
immigration law enforcement are powerless to stop them from doing so.  Local 
employees can cooperate with federal immigration law enforcement during working 
hours (when they are being paid by their government employers) and even without the 
knowledge of their employers.126 The federal government is, in effect, inserting itself 
between local governments and their employees, carving out a substantive area 
(immigration law enforcement) where their employers cannot tread.  
 The 1996 laws also interfere with the sovereign power of local governments to 
control the use of confidential information they obtain.  The Second Circuit, in New York 
City’s litigation challenging the 1996 laws, recognized the sovereign implications of 
controlling confidential information like immigration status:  “The obtaining of pertinent 
information, which is essential to the performance of a wide variety of state and local 
governmental functions, may in some cases be difficult or impossible if some expectation 
 
125 See Koog v. United States, 79 F.3d 452, 460 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Whatever the outer limits of state 
sovereignty may be, it surely encompasses the right to set the duties of office for state-created officials and 
to regulate the internal affairs of governmental bodies.”); Romero v. United States, 883 F.Supp. 1076, 1086 
(W.D. La. 1995) (“One way in which the State of Louisiana exercises its sovereign right of maintaining a 
public order within its borders is by defining and assigning the duties of its sheriffs”). 
126 If local governments passed laws to prohibit such cooperation during business hours or to require 
employees to report their cooperation activities, the laws would likely be preempted by the 1996 laws as 
illegal restrictions on employees’ protected cooperation rights.  For more on the preemption analysis, see 
Section II.C.2.C, supra.
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of confidentiality is not preserved.”127 And without access to pertinent, confidential 
information, local government operations may likely be hindered.   
 It is important to note that the immigration information at issue here is 
government information.  Local government employees are given access to the 
information, not in their capacities as private citizens, but as representatives of their local 
government employers.  As such, the 1996 laws are particularly intrusive of local 
government sovereignty, enabling the federal government to insert itself between local 
governments and their constituents, to obtain otherwise confidential information.  
(c) Innovation
The harm to the federalism value of innovation is apparent by comparing the 
small number of local governments that has passed non-cooperation laws128 with the 
majority that have not.  For various reasons, those local governments with non-
cooperation laws have decided to separate immigration law enforcement from their other 
governmental functions.129 The non-cooperation laws may be successful in achieving 
their policy goals or they may not.  If they are successful, the laws would serve as models 
for other local governments seeking to find the appropriate law enforcement balance.  If 
the laws are not successful, then other local governments will know to avoid such laws.  
 
127 City of New York, 971 F.Supp. at 36.  The Second Circuit declined to consider this argument because 
New York City did not, despite a request from the court, substantiate its position that the immigration 
information at issue was protected under City law from dissemination generally (versus dissemination only 
to federal immigration authorities, as the contested Executive Order provided).  Id. at 37. 
128 At the time that this article went into publication, the number of local governments with non-
cooperation laws was approximately 49.  NILC ANNOTATED CHART, supra note 10. 
129 The federal government, in a reorganization of its immigration functions post 9/11, has implemented a 
similar separation:  the enforcement arm of the former INS has been reorganized into two separate agencies 
(Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection), 
while the service functions of the INS (e.g., visa and citizenship applications) are now done by the Bureau 
of Citizenship and Immigration Services.  LEGOMSKY, supra note 37, at 3-4. 
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By preempting non-cooperation laws, the 1996 laws eliminate this 
experimentation and the possible positive synergies that could result. 
 
III.  Ignoring Federalism Harms of Cooperation Statutes:  Why Current Law is 
Inadequate
Despite the substantial federalism harms that cooperation laws like the 1996 laws 
cause, these laws pass constitutional muster under current law.  Under current law, the 
1996 laws preempt the non-cooperation laws as a valid exercise of the federal 
government’s immigration power.  The Tenth Amendment and principles of state 
sovereignty, used in recent years to strike down overreaching federal legislation, do not 
provide any relief to the local non-cooperation laws here.  Current Tenth Amendment 
jurisprudence draws a bright line distinction between (1) unconstitutional federal laws 
that commandeer local governments into passing federal laws or enforcing federal 
schemes and (2) constitutional federal laws that simply preempt local law by prohibiting 
local government action in a particular area.  The 1996 laws, because they are framed as 
prohibitions, fall on the constitutional side of the bright line.  But this bright line rule, 
while ostensibly easy to administer, ignores the significant federalism harms discussed 
above that prohibitions like the 1996 laws cause.130 
130 See Section II.D.2, supra.
This preemption/commandeering distinction has analogies in other areas of constitutional law.  
For example, Supreme Court decisions have held that the government violates a person’s due process rights 
if a government official, acting under color of law, beats a person, but there is no similar due process 
violation if the government fails to protect a person from privately inflicted beatings.  Compare Grandstaff 
v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 167, 169 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding due process violation when police 
officers fatally shot an innocent man, mistakenly believing he was a fugitive) with DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989) (no due process violation when state 
social services department failed to protect a boy from severe beatings by his father, though department had 
been informed of the abuse over a 26 month period). 
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A.  Unconstitutional Commandeering
In a pair of landmark decisions issued in the 1990s, the Supreme Court defined an 
anticommandeering principle to protect states from overreaching by Congress.131 The 
essence of this principle is that states and the federal government co-exist as dual 
sovereigns, and any attempt by Congress to treat states as mere political subdivisions of 
the federal government is commandeering that violates the Tenth Amendment.132 
Applying the anticommandeering principle, the Court in New York v. United States struck 
down federal legislation that required states to accept ownership of radioactive waste or 
regulate according to Congress’ instructions.133 The federal law was unconstitutional, 
reasoned the Court, because it commandeered state lawmaking processes; regardless of 
the “choice” that states made, they would be required to pass laws to effectuate that 
choice.134 And independent lawmaking, said the Court, is at the core of state sovereignty 
protected by the Tenth Amendment.135 
In Printz v. United States, the Court engaged in similar analysis to extend the 
anticommandeering principle to strike down a federal provision that required local law 
enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective gun buyers.136 The 
provision was unconstitutional, the Court held, because it commandeered state executive 
officials into enforcing a federal law, violating principles of dual sovereignty.  The Court 
 
131 The anticommandeering principle was articulated in earlier cases (see, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981) and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982)), 
but New York and Printz were the first cases in which the Court rejected federal laws on this basis.     
132 The Tenth Amendment states:  “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited to it by the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. 
X.   
133 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
134 Id. at 175-76. 
135 Id. at 188. 
136 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
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categorically rejected the government’s proposed balancing test of federal-state interests:  
“It is the very principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends, and no 
comparative assessment of the various interests can overcome that fundamental 
defect.”137 
What about commandeering—whether of state legislative process or of state 
executive officials—did the Court find so offensive so as to categorically reject it?  The 
Court’s overriding concern was that commandeering upsets the proper balance between 
federal and state authority, a balance necessary to protect individual liberty.  “[T]he 
Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection 
of individuals. . .  Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of 
the Federal Government serves to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any 
one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government 
will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”138 
A secondary but related concern for the Court was the negative effects of 
commandeering on political accountability:  “[W]here the Federal Government directs 
the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public 
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain 
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decisions.”139 
Because it believed that these concerns would always be problematic in the 
context of commandeering laws, the Court drew a bright line distinction, holding that 
laws that commandeered states into enacting or enforcing federal laws are always 
unconstitutional. 
 
137 Id. at 932 (emphasis in original). 
138 New York, 505 U.S. at 181. 
139 Id. at 169. 
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 B.  Constitutional Preemption
On the constitutional side of the Court’s bright line rule are federal laws that 
preempt state action in an area of federal power.  There is no violation of the Tenth 
Amendment or state sovereignty principles if Congress, by passing its own laws, simply 
prohibits states from taking action in an area in which Congress has legislative authority.  
Federal preemption remains constitutional even if local governments have to take some 
legislative or executive action to comply with the federal law (e.g., rescinding conflicting 
local law or familiarizing local government employees with federal requirements). 
This, essentially, was the Court’s holding in Reno v. Condon, decided three years 
after Printz.140 In Condon, South Carolina raised a Tenth Amendment challenge to a 
federal law that prohibited states from disclosing drivers’ personal information without 
their consent.141 South Carolina argued that the federal law required state officials to 
learn and apply the law’s restrictions, thus commandeering them into enforcing federal 
law in violation of Printz.142 The Court agreed that state officials would have to spend 
time and effort to comply with the federal law, but the Court, in a unanimous decision, 
found no Tenth Amendment violation because the federal law at issue regulated state 
activity (owning a database), rather than state regulation of its own citizens.143 
More significantly, the federal law pressed no affirmative duty on the state:  “It 
does not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it 
does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating 
private individuals.”  Because it did not require an affirmative duty, the Court held that 
 
140 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 149-50. 
143 Id. at 150-51. 
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the federal law was “consistent with the constitutional principles enunciated in New York 
and Printz.”144 
C. Cooperation Laws as Federal Preemption
The peculiar language of the 1996 laws shows that they were drafted to take 
advantage of this preemption/commandeering distinction drawn by the Supreme Court.  
The 1996 laws are drafted as a double-negative:  local governments are prohibited from 
prohibiting their employees from reporting undocumented persons.  The intended (and 
practical) effect of this double-negative is that local government employees will report 
undocumented persons, because they are not prohibited by non-cooperation laws from 
doing so. 
 Though the 1996 laws may likely result in affirmative action by local government 
employees, their phrasing as prohibitions means that under current case law, they are per 
se constitutional.  There is no affirmative obligation placed on local governments to 
report undocumented persons, because arguably this would be commandeering in 
violation of Printz.145 Rather, the 1996 laws are more like the federal prohibition upheld 
in Condon. The Second Circuit, in turning away New York City’s constitutional 
challenge to the 1996 laws, held that New York and Printz did not apply.  “In the case of 
 
144 Id. at 151. 
145 The constitutionality of this hypothetical federal obligation is not clear.  In Printz v. United States, the 
Court reserved judgment on the constitutionality of federal laws that “require only the provision of 
information to the Federal Government.”  521 U.S. 898 at 918 (1997).  In her concurrence, Justice 
O’Connor emphasized that the Court was not deciding the constitutionality of “purely ministerial reporting 
requirements imposed by Congress on state and local authorities.”  Id. at 936.  Scholars have suggested that 
reporting requirements are unconstitutional because they are more intrusive of state sovereignty than the 
commandeering laws prohibited by New York and Printz. With the reporting requirements, states have no 
policymaking discretion.  See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 885 (3d ed. 2000). 
It’s also not clear whether the hypothetical reporting requirement would be “purely ministerial” in 
nature.  As a practical matter, the federal government would also need local governments to detain the 
undocumented persons until ICE or another federal agency could take custody.  The federal government 
would also likely need local governments to conduct small-scale investigations to determine who is 
illegally present in the first place.  Either of these requirements would easily cross the purely ministerial 
threshold into the realm of unconstitutional commandeering laws. 
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Sections 434 and 642, Congress has not compelled state and local governments to enact 
or administer any federal regulatory program.  Nor has it affirmatively conscripted states, 
localities, or their employees into the federal government’s service.”146 In other words, 
the 1996 laws merely preempted New York City’s executive order but did not 
unconstitutionally commandeer the city into enforcing a federal scheme.   
But given the significant federalism harms that cooperation laws like the 1996 
laws cause, the laws should not be given a constitutional pass simply because they are 
technically phrased as prohibitions.  
 
IV:  Intermediate Review as the Federalism Fix
A better approach than hewing to the commandeering/preemption distinction is to 
allow for intermediate review of federal cooperation laws on a case-by-case basis.  
Intermediate review has the advantages of allowing for a more nuanced consideration of 
federalism interests and of reflecting the potential harm of cooperation statutes, leading to 
a better federalism result. 
 A.  The Intermediate Review Model:
Intermediate review here would essentially be a balancing test.  Local 
governments challenging federal cooperation laws would have to demonstrate an 
important sovereign interest in self-regulation and substantial federal interference with 
that sovereign interest.  The court considering the challenge would weigh these local 
interests against the federal government’s articulated interest in requiring local 
cooperation, determining whether that federal interest is substantially related to the 
cooperation law and whether there are viable alternatives to mandatory cooperation. 
 
146 City of New York, 179 F.3d at 35. 
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 The intermediate nature of this review stems from the neutral stance that it takes 
toward cooperation laws.147 Instead of stacking the deck toward either federal or local 
governments as the current paradigm does,148 intermediate review allows for a neutral 
weighing of competing federal-local interests.  To meet their burden of proof, local 
governments are required to demonstrate an important sovereign interest (in between 
rational and compelling) and substantial federal interference with that interest (in 
between just some interference and crippling interference).  And those local interests are 
then weighed against federal interests, taking into account whether federal interests are 
substantially related to enforcement of the cooperation law and whether the federal 
government has viable alternatives to mandating cooperation (e.g., the costs of obtaining 
local cooperation through exercise of its Spending Clause power). 
B.  Why Intermediate Review Make Sense:
The neutral weighing of federal and local interests, with the goal of achieving the 
correct federalism balance, is the biggest advantage of intermediate review.  Moreover, 
the level of scrutiny in intermediate review also accurately reflects the potential 
federalism harm of cooperation laws—less harm than outright commandeering but more 
harm than in Spending Clause cases.   
1. Weighing Federal-Local Interests
The biggest advantage of intermediate review is that the conflict between federal 
and local interests that cooperation laws create can be weighed in a judicial forum.  Not 
 
147 In this respect, it is similar to use of intermediate review in the equal protection context:  See Jeffrey M. 
Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 
162-63 (1984) (describing the Burger Court’s development of intermediate review as a “neutral stance that 
favors neither the government nor the party challenging [the legislation]”).   
148 See Section III.C, supra.
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only is this weighing more likely to lead to the “correct” federalism result, but the public 
weighing of competing interests can, of itself, have beneficial federalism effects. 
Unlike a bright line rule that would hold federal cooperation laws to be per se 
constitutional (as the current legal framework does) or per se unconstitutional, 
intermediate review allows for the weighing of competing local-federal interests on a 
case-by-case basis.  This weighing is more likely to lead to the correct federalism result, 
with some cooperation laws upheld and others struck down, depending on the different 
local-federal interests at stake in each case.  In this way, application of intermediate 
review here parallels the use of intermediate review in the equal protection context: there 
is the recognition in both that the contested federal law may have unconstitutional results 
in some but not all cases.149 
I’ve argued above that the local interests in the immigration context make a 
compelling federalism argument for striking down the 1996 laws.  There may be, 
however, other contexts where the federal interest in cooperation outweighs the local 
interest in sovereignty.  For example, the federal interest in requiring local cooperation 
with federal criminal tax enforcement would clearly be significant, while any local 
interest in non-cooperation is less clear.150 
Regardless of the judicial result in any particular case, the weighing process itself 
has a positive federalism effect.  Under the current legal framework, these competing 
interests are not aired or discussed; rather, federal cooperation laws are presumed to be 
per se constitutional.  Intermediate review is an opportunity for local governments to 
articulate the sovereignty effects of cooperation laws on them, an opportunity that is 
 
149 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 646. 
150 State taxing authorities are one of the main sources of information for federal criminal tax 
investigations.  PATRICIA T. MORGAN, TAX PROCEDURE AND TAX FRAUD IN A NUTSHELL 256 (1990). 
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currently denied them.  Knowing that it could be called upon to defend its interests in 
passing cooperation laws, the federal government would be forced to consider the full 
federalism costs of cooperation laws and thus perhaps may be more willing to employ 
other methods to secure local cooperation, like exercising its Spending Clause power, that 
arguably have fewer negative federalism effects. 
2. Intermediate Review for Intermediate Harm
The intermediate scrutiny of intermediate review also accurately reflects the 
potential federalism harm of cooperation statutes--between the outright disruption that 
federal commandeering causes and the federalism choice that federal Spending Clause 
cases present. 
Compare the effect of the 1996 laws with hypothetical federal laws requiring local 
governments outright to report illegal immigrants or to do so as a condition for receiving 
federal funds.  The first hypothetical law would be a commandeering of local officials of 
the type prohibited by Printz. To comply, local officials would have to institute 
procedures to implement the mandatory reporting (e.g., determining who are mandatory 
reporters) and set aside time and other resources to do so, with the result that in most 
local jurisdictions, illegal immigrants would be reported to federal authorities.  The 
federalism harms of this commandeering are apparent:  local officials are required to 
implement federal policies, at great expense to local resources and local sovereignty, 
while the federal government gains considerable additional enforcement power, paying 
little financial or political cost. 
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The second hypothetical law would be a federal exercise of its Spending Clause 
power, of the type approved by Condon.151 If local governments choose to help enforce 
immigration laws, they would take many of the same steps that local governments 
commandeered into enforcement would have to take.  The difference, of course, is that 
under this hypothetical, local governments make the initial decision about whether to 
participate and thus all the subsequent steps they take to implement enforcement are 
arguably voluntary.152 
The federalism harms that cooperation laws cause fall in between, justifying the 
application of a more neutral intermediate review.  As the Second Circuit in New York 
City recognized, the 1996 laws do not require local officials to pass federally directed 
legislation or to enforce a federal scheme.153 Yet, as explained earlier, the federalism 
harms are substantial,154 and certainly more substantial than in Spending Clause cases 
because federal cooperation laws do not offer local governments any choice regarding 
participation.  Thus, because of the intermediate federalism harm that cooperation laws 
can cause, subjecting them to intermediate review makes sense.  
Others have argued persuasively that balancing tests should be applied in all 
Tenth Amendment cases.155 My purpose here is more limited: rather than articulate a 
 
151 This second example may not be hypothetical for too much longer.  Proposed federal legislation 
provides financial assistance to local governments enforcing immigration laws.  See Section II.C.1, supra.
152 Many have questioned whether Spending Clause cases actually offer local governments any real choice, 
given disparities in federal versus local taxing powers and local reliance on federal tax revenues.  See Lynn 
A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1935 (1995) (arguing that 
because of the federal government’s monopoly power over state revenue sources, any offer of federal funds 
to states should be “presumptively coercive”). 
153 City of New York, 971 F.Supp. at 35. 
154 See Section II.D.2, supra.
155 See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law:  Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 2180, 2257 (1998) (criticizing Printz’ bright line rule and favoring a “deferential, flexible, multifactor 
approach” to developing limits on Congressional authority); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 588 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (instead of abandoning all efforts to 
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complete doctrine for all Tenth Amendment challenges, I focus on federal cooperation 
laws as a compelling case for discarding the bright line rules of current Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence and applying a balance test that better achieves the purposes 
of federalism. 
 
V:  Conclusion
Returning to the question posed in the introduction, it is clear that local 
governments, under current Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, do not have a 
constitutional right to refuse cooperation with a federal enforcement scheme.  Should 
local governments have this right?  Using immigration law enforcement as a case study, 
I’ve suggested that there are compelling federalism interests that may justify local non-
cooperation with federal enforcement schemes.  Because federal cooperation laws 
significantly boost federal power at the expense of local sovereignty interests, they may 
harm the underlying values of federalism:  promoting democracy, preventing tyranny, 
and encouraging innovation among local governments. 
Under the current legal framework, however, these federalism interests are 
ignored on the technical grounds that the federal government is not commandeering local 
governments, but rather, is merely exercising its preemption power.  As an alternative 
that better addresses the federalism interests, I’ve suggested applying intermediate review 
that, in a more neutral way, weighs the competing local-federal interests on a case-by-
case basis to reach a better federalism result. 
 
define state spheres of power in favor of political resolution, the Court should employ a balancing test with 
state sovereignty as a factor to weigh). 
